Flowerbx v Flowers Box London: When a Composite Mark Is Not Descriptive
The U.K Intellectual Property Enterprise Court concluded that the trademark FLOWERBX did not designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, of the goods or services it was registered for use with. This result seems to be similar to that a Canadian Court would reach. Flowerbx Ltd v Flowers Box London Ltd [2026] EWHC 2233 (IPEC)
The Plaintiff
The plaintiff started trading in the UK in 2015. Its founder and chief executive officer had previously worked for many years in the fashion industry, notably at Gucci and then as Senior Vice President of Communications at Tom Ford. She testified that she had found it frustrating that there was not an online solution for the kinds of elegant and modern flowers generally used in the high-end fashion business, and so she decided to open a business to fulfil that perceived need. She conceived the FLOWERBX mark which she felt would 'sound modern, disruptive and fashionforward.'
Initially, she intended to create a direct-to-consumer business, but some of her contacts in the fashion business asked if the plaintiff could provide flowers for events such as fashion shows, or for shops or restaurants, and so the company developed a business-to-business model. Later it developed a homeware range, after customers asked for flowers in vases.
The plaintiff’s business was quite successful, and it claimed it had established acquired distinctiveness in the FLOWERBX mark and had a reputation for 'luxury and stylish floral design of the highest quality.' It claimed to have spent substantial sums on marketing, and relied upon articles in the UK press mentioning it.
The plaintiff also obtained a U.K registration for FLOWERBX (the Mark) for a list of specific goods, associated retail services, delivery services and floral design services.
The Defendant
The Defendant was incorporated on 17 April 2019 and began to supply flowers and bouquets of all kinds (i.e. not just as arrangements in a box) and plants, as well as gifts and gift cards, through online sales. It was also targeting the luxury end of the market.
The signs used by the defendant were FLOWERS BOX and FLOWERS BOX LONDON as well as the url www.flowersbox.co.uk. When not used in plain type, the defendant used the latter sign in a form where the words Flowers and Box appeared above and in larger font than London:

The defendant also used a form of the signs with a gold B above the words.

The defendant must have become aware of the potential for confusion between the parties almost immediately after it began to trade in 2019, as from July 2019 onwards it received a series of messages from Trustpilot, congratulating it for 5-star reviews for FLOWERBX. The defendant wrote to complain about the confusion in February 2022, when it was credited with a poor review, and told Trustpilot that it was not Flowerbx or Flower Box and said that it received emails about undelivered orders all the time 'where clients email us with issues from different companies as they just emailed wrong brand by accident.'
The defendant did not respond to a demand, and the plaintiff initiated an action for infringement of the mark. The defendant denied infringement and alleged the plaintiff’s Mark was invalid as it was descriptive. The action proceeded to trial.
Invalidity
The U.K. Trade Marks Act 1994 provides that trade marks shall not be registered… which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of services, or other characteristics of goods or services.
Provided that, a trade mark shall not be refused registration… if, before the date of application for registration, it has in fact acquired a distinctive character as a result of the use made of it.'
To succeed with its claim for invalidity the onus was on the defendant to show that there was a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the sign and the goods and services in question to enable the public concerned immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or one of their characteristics.
The plaintiff argued that the combination of the word 'flower' and the letters 'bx' into a portmanteau word or neologism allowed them to avoid the prohibition. However, the judge disagreed since the plaintiff had take the position in the action that the Mark was and is pronounced as 'flower box' so that the Mark would be seen, heard and understood as including those two words.
The judge concluded the words 'flower box' were not descriptive of any of the challenged goods. The goods are all flowers, plants or foliage of various kinds, fresh or dried, or in bouquets. The specification did not refer to boxes or other containers, or packaging, or goods for displaying the flowers or plants, so that there was nothing to reflect the 'box' part of the Mark. The closest it gets is in the term 'planted flowers.' None of the evidence showed that the term 'flower box' would enable a consumer immediately to understand that it describes planted flowers.
In the absence of any reference in the specification to a box, container or planter, the Judge was not persuaded that the words 'flower box' would immediately permit the average consumer to identify any characteristic of any of the challenged terms. Similar reasoning applied to the services.
Infringement
The Judge said that the distinctive character of the Mark, the close and confusing similarity between it and FLOWERS BOX, the identity of the goods and the moderate degree of attention paid by the average consumer all pointed towards a likelihood of confusion. Even the signs which include LONDON and/or the gold B were close enough to the Mark, to be likely to lead to confusion when used in relation to identical goods or services to those for which the Mark was registered. Where the sign includes 'London' that word is obviously descriptive and might be taken as a sub-brand, leading to a risk of indirect confusion. The evidence of alleged confusion, though far from perfect, confirmed beyond doubt the risk of confusion in relation to all the signs and reinforced the Judge’s initial view that in all the circumstances of the case there was a likelihood of confusion. The claim to infringement succeeded.
The Canadian Position
Subsection 12(1)(b) of the Trademarks Act provides that a trademark is not registrable if it is, whether depicted, written or sounded, either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in the English or French languages of the character, or quality of the goods or services in association with which it is used or proposed to be used or of the conditions of or the persons employed in their production or of their place of origin.
The test for determining whether a trademark is either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive is the immediate or first impression formed by the ordinary user or purchaser of the goods or services in issue. The determination must not be based on research into or critical analysis of the meaning of the words. The common meaning of words in their ordinary and popular sense must be determined.
The word “clearly” in the subsection means easy to understand, self-evident, or plain. The concept of “clearness” is an essential element to preclude registration.
An approach similar to that taken by the Judge in the U.K. as describe above combined with a lack of “clearness” would likely avoid the prohibition in Canada.
While the test for confusion in Canada is different the result could well be similar.
Comment
The plaintiff’s choice of the Mark seems to have been a good one. The problem with a mark of this type is that in some cases it can be difficult to determine whether it is clearly descriptive. The principles are clear, but their application may not be.
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John McKeown
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This article is of general nature and is not intended to provide specific legal advice as individual situations will differ. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. Copyright © John Mckeown, All rights reserved. To unsubscribe to the IP Update please send me an email at jmckeown@Ln.Law
A version of this article originally appeared in the Law360 Canada published by LexisNexis Canada Inc.
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