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John McKeown
2 days ago
7 min read

The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that the Trademarks Act fundamentally creates a use-based regime. It would be inconsistent with such a regime to conclude that the Act, and subsection 17(2) specifically, affords rights based on use of a trademark that has been abandoned. Sea Tow Services International, Inc. v. C-Tow Marine Assistance Ltd. 2025 FC 27 and costs at 2025 FC 355 appeal dismissed 2026 FCA 177


The Facts

Sea Tow Services International, Inc. (Sea Tow) was incorporated in the State of New York in 1983. It uses a pre-paid membership model to deliver on-water services to recreational boaters including towing, fuel delivery, and repairs, as well as related membership services. It owns Canadian registrations for the word SEA TOW and a design version of the mark (together the Sea Tow Marks). It had filed previous applications for the same marks on December 20, 2002, on the basis of its US registrations and use but the applications, although allowed, were abandoned on September 20, 2010.


C-Tow Marine Assistance Ltd. (C-Tow) was incorporated in British Columbia in 2006. Its business model and the services it provides are similar to those of Sea Tow. C-Tow filed applications for registration of its trademarks, the word C-TOW and a design version (together, the C-Tow Marks). C-Tow asserts that it and its predecessors in title have used the C-Tow Marks in Canada since 1984. An examiner has cited the Sea Tow marks against the applications.


On April 21, 2022, C-Tow filed a notice of application in the Federal Court attacking the validity of the Sea Tow Marks and to strike the Sea Tow Marks from the Register of Trademarks.


On April 28, 2022, Sea Tow filed a statement of claim against C-Tow alleging that C-Tow infringed Sea Tow’s rights in the Sea Tow Marks. Sea Tow brought a motion for summary judgment in the action.


The Application and the motion were ordered to be heard together because the matters in issue overlapped.


The Federal Court Decision

The Federal Court granted C-Tow’s Application declaring the Sea Tow Registrations invalid and striking the Sea Tow Registrations from the register and the granted summary judgment in C-Tow’s favour.


Section 19 of the Act confers a presumption of validity on registered trademarks.  In the Application C-Tow bore the burden to rebut that presumption of validity by establishing at least one of its asserted grounds of invalidity.


C-Tow said that Sea Tow was not the person entitled to secure the registration of the Sea Tow Marks in Canada because on September 9, 2010 (when Sea Tow filed the applications that ultimately matured into the registrations), those marks were confusing with the C-Tow Marks that had previously been used by C-Tow in Canada.


Since C-Tow commenced the Application more than five years after the date of the registrations the registrations were incontestable and C-Tow could succeed only if established that Sea Tow adopted the Sea Tow Marks in Canada with knowledge of C-Tow’s previous use of the C-Tow Marks in Canada.


The Federal Court made the following findings:

  1. C-Tow had established, on a balance of probabilities, that it was a successor in title to users of the C-Tow Marks in Canada dating back to 1985.

  2. Pursuant to section 3 of the Act, Sea Tow was deemed to have adopted the Sea Tow Marks on September 9, 2010, the date of filing of its second applications for registration. Use of the C-Tow Marks by C-Tow and its predecessors predated Sea Tow’s adoption of the Sea Tow Marks.

  3. Sea Tow adopted the Sea Tow Marks with knowledge of C-Tow’s previous use of the C-Tow Marks in Canada as the evidence established such knowledge as early as December 1992.

  4. The Sea Tow Registrations were not incontestable pursuant to subsection 17(2) of the Act.


The Appeal

Sea Tow appealed from these decisions to the Federal Court of Appeal. The issues raised on appeal concerning the invalidity the registrations of the Sea Tow Marks for non-entitlement under the Act were as follows:

a) What is the correct statutory interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act?

b) Did the Federal Court make one or more palpable and overriding errors in its factual findings regarding C-Tow’s chain of title and continuous use of the C-Tow Marks in Canada?


The issues concerning the invalidity the registrations of the Sea Tow Marks for non-distinctiveness of the Act were as follows

a) What is the correct test in Canada in an expungement proceeding for invalidating a registered trademark as non-distinctive?

b) Did the Federal Court make one or more palpable and overriding errors in its factual finding that the Sea Tow Registrations were invalid as non-distinctive?


At the centre of Sea Tow’s appeals was the Federal Court’s analysis of section 3 of the Act and its interplay with subsection 17(2). Sea Tow argued that the Federal Court committed errors of law in its interpretation of the two provisions that resulted in the Court’s flawed finding that Sea Tow was deemed to have adopted the Sea Tow Marks on September 9, 2010, the date of filing of its second applications for registration. Sea Tow sought summary judgment in the Action primarily on the basis that it had adopted the Sea Tow Marks no later than December 20, 2002, the date Sea Tow filed its first applications for registration. 


On appeal, Sea Tow sought to look behind that date and rely on use in Canada of the Sea Tow Marks, including by its franchise operation in Leamington, Ontario in 1987–89, (a) to establish its deemed date of adoption of the Sea Tow Marks and (b) to assert that the Sea Tow Registrations are incontestable pursuant to subsection 17(2) and that the Application for expungement in reliance on paragraph 18(1)(d) should not have succeeded.


The Invalidity the Registrations of the Sea Tow Marks for Non-Entitlement

C-Tow’s application for expungement of the Sea Tow Registrations was based, in part, on paragraph 18(1)(d). Paragraph 18(1)(d) provides that the registration of a trademark is invalid if, subject to section 17, the applicant for registration “was not the person entitled to secure the registration”.


Subsection 17(2) limits the ability of an applicant to challenge a registered trademark if the applicant files its application for expungement more than five years after the date of registration. The subsection affords a heightened level of protection to a registered trademark that survives unchallenged for five years but, the protection is not absolute. The “incontestability” of the registered trademark can be defeated if “it is established that the person who adopted the registered trademark in Canada did so with knowledge of that previous use or making known”.


Section 3 looks to the basis of entitlement of the trademark holder to determine the date of adoption of the trademark in question, whether registered or unregistered. A trademark is deemed to have been adopted when a person or their predecessor in title (a) begins to use the trademark in Canada, (b) begins to make it known in Canada, or (c) files, if the trademark has not been so used or made known, an application for its registration in Canada. 


The Federal Court Judge said that the Trademarks Act creates what is fundamentally a use-based regime. Just as it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act to conclude that it affords rights based on an abandoned application that does not necessarily reflect any use of the relevant mark, it is inconsistent with such purpose to conclude that the Act affords rights based on use that has been abandoned.


The Court of Appeal agreed. The Judge’s interpretation of section 3 is consistent with the text of the provision and the words “commenced to use”, and with the context and purpose of the Act, which as the Federal Court stated, fundamentally creates a use-based regime. It would be inconsistent with such a regime to conclude that the Act, and subsection 17(2) specifically, affords rights based on use of a trademark that has been abandoned.


The Invalidity of the Registrations of the Sea Tow Marks for Non-Distinctiveness

Subsection 57(1) and paragraph 18(1)(b) of the Act provide that expungement proceedings may be brought if a registered trademark is not distinctive at the date of application for expungement. Under paragraph 38(2)(d), an application for the registration of a trademark may be opposed on the basis that the mark is not distinctive. Paragraphs 18(1)(d) and 38(2)(d) both embody the fundamental role of a trademark in distinguishing the source of a particular product or service from competing products or services.


The term “distinctive” in relation to a trademark is set out in section 2 of the Act as any mark “that actually distinguishes the goods or services in association with which it is used by its owner from the goods or services of others or that is adapted so to distinguish them”. Section 2 does not define the word “distinctive” differently depending on type of proceeding. The inquiry into distinctiveness in opposition and expungement proceedings turns on the extent to which a mark is known in the marketplace and whether that knowledge suffices to negate the distinctiveness of another mark. There is one test to determine whether, at the relevant date, a trademark is distinctive.


The Federal Court did not inappropriately reverse the burden of proof for establishing non-distinctiveness for purposes of section 57 and paragraph 18(1)(b) of the Act. To the contrary, the Federal Court explicitly said that C-Tow, as the party seeking expungement, bore the burden of establishing non-distinctiveness of the Sea Tow Marks. 


Palpable and Overriding Errors in The Federal Courts Factual Findings 

A palpable error is an error that is obvious and an overriding error is one that goes to the very core of the outcome of the case. The Appellate Court found that the Federal Court’s analysis amply supported its conclusions regarding C-Tow’s chain of title and its continuous use of the C-Tow Marks in Canada as well as the conclusion that Sea Tow Registrations were invalid as non-distinctive.


To ensure your rights are fully protected reach out to us for a detailed review of your situation. 


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If you have questions, please contact me at  jmckeown@LN.Law


John McKeown

Loopstra Nixon LLP.  

130 Adelaide St W Suite 2800

Toronto, Ontario, 

M5H 3P5

Canada

437 290-5960


This article is of general nature and is not intended to provide specific legal advice as individual situations will differ. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. Copyright © John Mckeown, All rights reserved. To unsubscribe to the IP Update please send me an email at jmckeown@Ln.Law


A version of this article originally appeared in the Law360 Canada published by LexisNexis Canada Inc.


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